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Evaluation of the federal sentencing guidelines' and their operation
to date is currently the focus of much study and discussion. The U.S.
Sentencing Commission recently issued a four-year report on the topic,2
the General Accounting Office has also recently completed a study, and
academics and practitioners nationwide are devoting considerable atten-
tion to the subject. Because of the profound impact sentencing guidelines
have on the administration of the criminal justice system, careful study
and clear analysis are essential to producing a useful evaluation.
From the outset, however, two factors muddy such analysis. First,
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes operate concurrently with the
guidelines and, indeed, formed the basis for the Commission's guidelines
for drug-related offenses.3 Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the effects
of mandatory minimum statutes from those of the sentencing guidelines.
Second, the databases available to researchers in the sentencing area were
not designed for this evaluation, and, as a result, they have their limita-
tions. Quantitative assessments must therefore be viewed with caution,
conclusions must be tempered with some skepticism, and final judgments
must be reserved. Nevertheless, research has produced significant data
that deserve attention and warrant consideration in policy-making.
* Senior U.S. District Judge, Northern District of California; Director, Federal Judicial
Center. B.A. 1948, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1951, Harvard Law School.
1. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992) [here-
inafter U.S.S.G.].
2. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SEN-
TENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING
(1991).
3. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2D1.1 cmt. n.10; id. § 5G1.1.
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Recent research by the Federal Judicial Center has focused on the
sentencing of drug offenders over a seven-year period, during which both
the mandatory minimum statutes and the sentencing guidelines went into
effect. The Center's primary interest was the impact of the mandatory
minimum sentencing laws.4 Regrettably, no database exists that sepa-
rates out sentences imposed under mandatory minimum laws. The
Center was, therefore, unable to identify, collect, or analyze cases dis-
posed of under those laws.' But by using information from presentence
reports, the Center was able to study drug convictions and determine
which drug amounts warranted a sentence under the mandatory mini-
mum laws and which did not. This Comment looks at what that
research discloses about sentencing disparity under the mandatory mini-
mum laws and the implications of those findings for the administration of
criminal justice under existing sentencing laws.
I. THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
A study conducted primarily by Dr. Barbara Meierhoefer for the
Federal Judicial Center demonstrates how certain sentencing factors
have influenced the length of sentences imposed on drug offenders.6 The
study lists the following influential factors for offenders with mandatory
minimum behaviors and for other drug offenders: the drug type and
amount, and the defendant's prior record, role in the offense, gender, and
race.
7
Putting aside drug type, quantity, and prior offenses-which are the
operative sentencing factors under the mandatory minimum statutes-it
is curious that the other identified factors should influence the sentencing
of offenders with mandatory minimum behavior, given that the statute
4. Although such a time-series analysis does not allow unequivocal attribution of changes to
particular circumstances, noticeable changes in sentencing that occurred in 1987, following enact-
ment of mandatory minimum statutes but before the guidelines went into effect, are taken to suggest
an effect of these laws.
5. This deficiency should be remedied in future studies. The Sentencing Commission has been
collecting data since early 1989 on whether the charge for which a defendant was convicted carried a
mandatory minimum term. The Commission's Monitoring Unit, however, considers these data to be
of questionable reliability, based on samples it has drawn to study the effect of minimums.
6. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE GENERAL EFFECT OF
MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF FEDERAL SENTENCES
IMPOSED (1992) [hereinafter MEIERHOEFER, GENERAL EFFECT]; Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role
of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 367 (1992).
7. MEIERHOEFER, GENERAL EFFECT, supra note 6, at 16-21.
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itself bars their consideration, at least for sentencing below the
mandatory minimum.8
If mandatory minimum laws were applied automatically to the stat-
utory offense behaviors, letting the chips fall where they may, one would
expect that after the mandatory minimum drug laws became effective in
1986, the sentences would differ little based on the defendant's role in the
offense, gender, or race. Instead, since 1986 the sentences for the more
culpable drug offenders have remained more than double those for simi-
larly situated, less culpable drug offenders;9 males continue to receive
sentences about forty percent higher than those of females.10 Moreover,
of all cases in which the offense behavior warranted a mandatory mini-
mum sentence, defendants received a sentence at or above that minimum
level only sixty percent of the time.11
The irony that emerges is that discretion seems to intrude into even
the most rigid sentencing scheme. That being so, the issue becomes, why
give all this discretion to advocator prosecutors and none to neutral
judges? The purpose of Congress-to send a message to drug dealers
that if they sell, for instance, five grams of crack, they'll go to prison for
five years-is not being accomplished. Congressional and administration
supporters of mandatory minimum sentencing should have doubts about
the validity of their underlying assumptions in light of this startling evi-
dence of discretionary application of the laws.12 It is not that the sen-
tencing scheme is not tough or rigid enough, but rather that the tougher
and more rigid it is, the more determined the effort (and the greater the
need) to circumvent it.
II. RACIAL DISPARITY
The most disturbing data to come out of the study are those sug-
gesting racial disparity in the application of mandatory minimum laws.
The difference between the average sentence imposed on black offenders
versus that imposed on white offenders has increased (from twenty-eight
percent in 1984 to forty-nine percent in 1990).13 The racially disparate
8. The statutes do, of course, allow courts to impose sentences above the minimum, in con-
formity with the sentencing guidelines, but the minimum is generally so high that the exercise of
upward discretion is not a significant factor in the operation of mandatory minimum statutes.
9. MEERHOEFER, GENERAL EFFECT, supra note 6, at 16-21.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. In addition, the efficacy of using severe sentences as a potential deterrent for groups of
offenders who do not believe they will be caught has always been questionable.
13. MEIERHOEFER, GENERAL EFFECr, supra note 6, at 16-21.
19921
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impact of mandatory minimum sentences is further supported by the fact
that, among defendants whose behavior warranted a mandatory mini-
mum sentence, nonwhite defendants received the mandatory prison term
twenty percent more often than white defendants.14
Presumably, racial animus is not a factor in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. But it is quite likely that mandatory minimums
have a disproportionate racial impact because of the higher penalties for
the sale and distribution of crack compared with those for powder
cocaine. 5 The penalties for crack are 100 times as severe as those for
cocaine: For example, five grams of so-called cocaine base, known com-
monly as crack, is treated the same as 500 grams of cocaine; fifty grams
of crack is treated the same as five kilos of cocaine; and, incidentally,
crack is treated twenty times more severely than heroin. 16 As a result,
even small, street-level crack dealers become subject to severe mandatory
minimum sentences and are caught up in the net of federal prosecutions.
This means not only that crack defendants are disproportionately black
because of the more frequent use of crack in the inner city, but also that
most of them are small-time dealers who have little information to offer
the prosecutor in exchange for a reduced charge or a downward depar-
ture in their sentence for providing "substantial assistance," authorized
under the statute on the motion of the government. In comparison, deal-
ers in large quantities of cocaine are more likely to have information
about chains of distribution that the government would consider worth
bargaining for.
This situation results from the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act,17 which
prescribed these increased penalties for crack. The law's legislative his-
tory reveals great concern in Congress over a national crack epidemic
stimulated by the then-recent deaths of star athletes Len Bias, a basket-
ball player, and Don Rogers, a football player.1 Crack, which can be
smoked, was also regarded as much more addictive than cocaine. And
because crack is effective in smaller quantities, it was thought to be more
affordable for young people. For those reasons, the existing drug laws
were considered inadequate to deal with the perceived dangers.
14. Id.
15. The supposition cannot be tested directly because the available databases do not differenti-
ate between crack and powder cocaine. The Sentencing Commission is now in the process of imple-
menting a data module that will include this distinction.
16. U.S.S.G., supra note I, § 2D.1 cmt. n.10(c).
17. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1988)).
18. "Crack" Cocaine: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986).
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The extreme disparity between crack penalties and those for
cocaine, and the accompanying racially disparate impact, have raised
questions concerning a potential violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Federal courts of appeals have so far rejected constitutional
attacks on the treatment of crack offenders. 19 However, in State v. Rus-
sell,20 the Minnesota Supreme Court declared unconstitutional as applied
a state statute under which possession of three grams of crack carried the
same punishment as possession of ten grams of cocaine. 21 The court
found inadequate evidence to support the statute's underlying premise
that possession of the required amount signified that the defendant was a
dealer. 2  It also found insufficient evidence to support a distinction
between crack and cocaine based on their relative dangers and addictive
qualities. 23 Most significantly, the court found that of those charged
with crack possession, ninety-seven percent were black; of those charged
with cocaine possession, eighty percent were white. 4
III. INCENTIVES TO PLEAD GUILTY
Aside from the problem of disparate racial impact, the Center's
study also shows the significant effect the mandatory minimum statutes
have on the prosecutor's power to make charging decisions and to secure
downward departures for substantial cooperation." Notwithstanding
the total absence of judicial discretion to sentence below the minimums,
some defendants appear able to negotiate out of mandatory minimum
sentences. Although specific data linking sentences to the statutes are
unavailable, it is undisputed that charging decisions, bargains, and
motions for downward departures result in below-minimum sentences
for behavior within the statutes.
A failure to gain a favorable charging decision or departure motion
from the prosecutor-whether as part of a plea bargain or otherwise-
19. See, e.g., United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259 (1lth Cir. 1992); United States v. Harding,
971 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1989 (1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39-40 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245,
1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
20. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 889-90.
23. Id. at 890.
24. Id. at 887 n.1.
25. MEIERHOEFER, GENERAL EFFECT, supra note 6, at 24-25.
1992]
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has devastating consequences for a defendant subject to mandatory mini-
mums. To illustrate, simple possession of one gram of crack carries a
five-year mandatory minimum sentence if it is a third offense;26 distribu-
tion of ten grams of crack carries a five-year minimum sentence or ten
years if it is a second drug felony conviction;27 distribution of fifty grams
of crack carries a ten-year minimum sentence or a twenty-year minimum
sentence if the defendant has a prior drug felony conviction-federal,
state, or foreign-and mandatory life in prison without parole after two
prior felony convictions.28
Faced with such penalties, and no possibility that judicial sentencing
discretion can intervene to mitigate their harshness, defendants often
conclude that little is lost by going to trial, unless the evidence would
disclose such egregious offense conduct that a judge might impose a sen-
tence above the minimum. It is safe to say, therefore, that the risk of a
mandatory minimum sentence provides a powerful impetus to go to trial
rather than plead guilty.
The incentives under mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are
profoundly different from those under the sentencing guidelines. While
substantially restricting judicial discretion, the guidelines nevertheless
offer several incentives to plead guilty: The sentence adjustments for
acceptance of responsibility and for obstruction of justice both operate to
serve that end.29 At the middle levels of the guidelines table, for exam-
ple, the two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility can produce
a spread between the high and low of the guidelines range of well over
one year, and in the higher criminal history categories of three years or
more.30 Further, the guidelines afford opportunities to negotiate about
other factors affecting the sentence, such as relevant conduct and role in
the offense.31
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATION
These distinctions between sentencing under the mandatory mini-
mum laws and under the sentencing guidelines must be kept in mind
when assessing sentencing data. In particular, any evaluation of the
impact of the sentencing guidelines on guilty-plea and trial rates will
26. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1988).
27. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1988).
28. bI § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988).
29. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3E1.1 cmt. nn.3-4.
30. See id. ch. 5, pt. A.
31. See, eg., id. § 1B1.8; ia ch. 1, pt. A., at 7 (1991).
HeinOnline -- 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 410 1992-1993
APPLES AND ORANGES
require careful analysis. Already there is evidence tending to show that
plea rates in drug and weapons cases are declining, whereas such rates
for other types of offenses are increasing.3 2 The decline in plea rates in
drug and weapons cases, many of which are subject to mandatory mini-
mums, may reflect the lack of incentives for a defendant to plead guilty
under the mandatory minimum statutes, rather than the impact of the
sentencing guidelines per se. While it is generally undisputed that sen-
tencing guidelines have made sentencing more time-consuming and bur-
densome for district court judges-not to mention appellate judges who
must hear appeals from sentencing decisions-it is far from clear that the
guidelines have affected the rate of pleas and trials. Therefore, assessing
the impact of the guidelines on plea and trial rates in drug and weapons
cases subject to mandatory minimum sentences, which the sentencing
guidelines incorporate, is highly problematic.
A fair evaluation of the operation of the guidelines will require
developing and segregating mandatory minimum data. This evaluation
would be aided considerably if the Sentencing Commission would
develop guidelines for drug cases independent of the mandatory mini-
mums. Although mandatory minimums trump the guidelines in any case
in which both apply, separating guidelines convictions from those driven
by mandatory minimums would make it possible to fairly and accurately
evaluate the operation and impact of each system.
32. Terence Dunworth & Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal Courts: The
Guidelines Experience, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99 (1992).
1992]
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